Colombo: The recent election of Anura Kumara Dissanayake as Sri Lanka’s new president marks a turning point in the country’s political landscape. Dissanayake, leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Marxist-leaning party, rose to power on promises of tackling corruption, addressing Sri Lanka's dire economic crisis, and representing the masses. His presidency, however, comes at a time when Sri Lanka is not only grappling with severe economic challenges but also facing growing concerns over its deepening ties with China.

Over the last decade, China, under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has significantly increased its influence in Sri Lanka through substantial investments in infrastructure projects, often funded by loans that have proven difficult for the island nation to repay. Sri Lanka’s debt to China has become a pressing issue, with many warning that the country is falling victim to China’s “debt trap diplomacy.” This tactic involves extending loans for large projects, and when the borrowing nation struggles to repay, China seizes control of strategic assets, consolidating its influence.

A prominent example of this is the Hambantota Port, which was built using Chinese loans but failed to generate enough profit. In 2019, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the port to China for 99 years after defaulting on its loan payments. The port is now seen as a symbol of China’s financial leverage over Sri Lanka and a critical asset in China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean.

Sri Lanka’s dependency on China deepened during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa, when billions of dollars flowed into infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s flagship global development program. However, many of these projects, including the Hambantota Port, have been criticized as economically unsustainable, providing little benefit to the local economy.

Now, under Dissanayake’s leadership, there are concerns that Sri Lanka could become even more entangled in China’s financial web. Chinese President Xi Jinping was one of the first to congratulate Dissanayake on his victory, pledging further cooperation under the BRI framework. Given Dissanayake’s left-leaning platform, some fear that he may turn to Beijing for additional financial aid, deepening Sri Lanka’s dependency on Chinese loans and political support.

The risks are significant. Sri Lanka already owes 11% of its $51 billion external debt to China, and further loans could tighten Beijing’s grip on the country. Critics argue that China’s investments in Sri Lanka have done little to stimulate the local economy. Many projects have been built by Chinese companies using Chinese labor, meaning much of the money has flowed back to China, leaving Sri Lanka with debt and few tangible benefits.

The larger geopolitical implications of China’s growing presence in Sri Lanka are also at play. Sri Lanka’s strategic location on one of the world’s busiest maritime routes makes it a key prize for China as it seeks to expand its naval influence in the Indian Ocean. By securing control over critical infrastructure like the Hambantota Port, China enhances its military and economic power far beyond its borders.

China’s involvement in Sri Lanka is not unique. The CCP has employed similar tactics in other developing countries, extending loans that lead to economic dependency and strategic control. In Africa, Southeast Asia, and even parts of Europe, nations have found themselves locked into long-term dependency on Beijing.

As Dissanayake takes office, Sri Lanka faces a critical choice: continue its engagement with China, potentially sinking further into debt and dependency, or seek alternative solutions that prioritize its sovereignty and economic stability. Observers warn that China’s promises of development often come with heavy strings attached, and once those strings are pulled, they are difficult to break.

For now, Sri Lanka’s future remains uncertain. The country is still reeling from its worst economic crisis in decades, and while external aid is needed, the risks of deeper entanglement with China’s debt diplomacy loom large. The decisions made by Dissanayake’s administration in the coming months will shape not only Sri Lanka’s economic recovery but also its long-term sovereignty.