Mumbai: Sixteen years ago, the city of Mumbai faced an unprecedented tragedy that left an indelible mark on the nation. On the night of November 26, 2008, ten heavily armed terrorists from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) unleashed a coordinated attack on five locations across the city. The horrifying siege claimed the lives of 166 people, including 140 Indians and 25 foreign nationals, leaving behind a legacy of grief, resilience, and courage.

As the nation marked the 16th anniversary of the Mumbai terror attacks, leaders, citizens, and security personnel paid heartfelt tributes to the victims and heroes. President Draupadi Murmu called the attack a "cowardly act" and saluted the bravery of the security forces. “A grateful nation salutes its brave security personnel who made the supreme sacrifice to protect our people. This is also a day to reiterate that India is firmly committed to defeating terrorism in all its forms,” the President stated in an emotional message on X (formerly Twitter).

Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Home Minister Amit Shah echoed similar sentiments, emphasizing India’s determination to eradicate terrorism. Shah described the attackers as “cowards who shame humanity,” while highlighting Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "zero-tolerance" policy toward terrorism.

Revisiting the Debate on State Sponsorship
The 26/11 attacks, which targeted landmarks including the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Oberoi Trident, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus, Leopold Café, and the Nariman House, were a chilling reminder of global terrorism's reach. Beyond the human toll, they ignited an enduring international debate on state involvement in terrorism.

State-Sponsored Operation:
India has consistently maintained that the attacks were a state-sponsored covert operation orchestrated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Investigations revealed that the attackers were trained and equipped with precision, suggesting significant institutional support.

Rogue Elements in ISI:
Some Western analysts argue that while elements within the ISI may have supported the attacks, it does not equate to direct state involvement. This narrative attempts to isolate "rogue" factions from official Pakistani policy.

No State Involvement:
Pakistani officials have steadfastly denied any state-based involvement, claiming the attacks were the work of non-state actors beyond their control.

The Complexity of Accountability
Investigations into the attacks, including dossiers shared by India and findings from international agencies, highlighted Pakistan-based support networks. Ajmal Kasab, the lone terrorist captured alive, provided detailed testimony linking the attackers to Pakistani handlers.

Despite this evidence, the issue remains mired in political complexity. The role of state sponsorship is often difficult to conclusively establish in covert operations involving intelligence agencies. As the years pass, the global focus on the attacks has waned, yet questions about accountability persist.

A Call for Vigilance and Justice
The anniversary of 26/11 serves as a solemn reminder of the human cost of terrorism and the importance of international cooperation in countering it. While the debate over state sponsorship continues, what remains clear is the need for vigilance, accountability, and a united stand against terrorism in all its forms.

India's unwavering commitment to justice for the victims and its determination to prevent such tragedies underscore the resilience of a nation that refuses to bow to terror.

What Happened on 26/11?

On November 26, 2008, Mumbai witnessed one of its darkest days as the city faced a coordinated terror attack by the Pakistan-based jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Despite being officially banned in Pakistan since 2002, LeT had continued its operations through covert fundraising and recruitment activities. Known for pioneering mass-casualty attacks in South Asia, LeT’s 26/11 operation stood out for two distinct reasons.

Firstly, the attacks targeted both Indian nationals and Westerners, ensuring significant global attention. Previously, LeT attacks had primarily focused on Indian citizens. Secondly, the attackers operated across multiple locations, attempting to infiltrate Mumbai's dense urban areas. Unlike past incidents where attackers fought to the death at a single site, 26/11 saw one gunman, Ajmal Kasab, captured alive by Mumbai police, marking a significant breakthrough.

Kasab’s arrest provided critical insights. During interrogation, he revealed that all the attackers were Pakistani nationals. He also confirmed that the operation was coordinated in real time from Karachi using mobile and internet communication. This evidence, corroborated by the FBI, linked the attackers to their handlers in Pakistan and highlighted LeT’s direct involvement.

Contradictions in the Aftermath

The official response from Pakistan following the attacks presented a complex picture. Diplomatically, Islamabad denied any state involvement while pledging cooperation in the investigation. However, efforts were simultaneously made to obscure evidence linking the attacks to Pakistan-based operatives. This inconsistency drew criticism domestically, including from former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who later acknowledged Pakistan’s failure to bring justice to the victims.

Investigations and Perspectives

Subsequent investigations by India, the United States, and Pakistan revealed varying interpretations of LeT and its connections to state actors like Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Indian investigators emphasized the role of the ISI in facilitating the attacks, while American inquiries examined both LeT’s operations and potential state support. Pakistani investigations largely focused on LeT as a non-state actor, downplaying or denying state involvement.

All three investigations agreed on LeT’s responsibility for the attacks. However, differing views persisted regarding the extent of state sponsorship, reflecting national biases and geopolitical complexities.

The Role of the ISI

Reports have long suggested that certain factions within Pakistan’s ISI, particularly its Security or "S" Wing, have supported militant groups. Historically, the ISI has been accused of using extremist proxies to further domestic and regional objectives. For instance, parallels have been drawn between the Hyderabad massacre of 1988 in Pakistan and the Mumbai attacks of 2008, where coordinated shootings targeted civilians in public spaces.

The ISI's internal dynamics further complicate the narrative. While the agency’s counterterrorism unit (ISI-CT) was established under U.S. influence to combat extremism, it has reportedly faced resistance from more powerful factions like the ISI-S, which oversees external operations. This duality has often resulted in conflicting agendas, with elements of the ISI allegedly supporting militant activities while ostensibly combating terrorism.

Challenges in Accountability

Efforts to hold key figures accountable have faced significant obstacles. For instance, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, LeT’s military commander and a prime suspect in the Mumbai attacks, was granted bail in 2014 amid allegations of judicial interference and threats against prosecutors. Such instances have fueled skepticism about Pakistan’s commitment to countering terrorism and dismantling groups like LeT.

International Perspectives on the ISI and Terrorism

For years, cross-border terrorism in South Asia was largely ignored by Western nations, as it primarily impacted Afghan and Indian nationals. This changed after the U.S. and its NATO allies invaded Afghanistan, bringing global attention to the region. A 2009 New York Times article highlighted the role of the ISI’s ‘S’ Wing in supporting attacks on U.S. forces, providing money, military supplies, and strategic guidance to Taliban commanders. This behavior mirrored the ISI's involvement in covert operations in Kashmir.

Scholars like Robert Johnson and David Ignatius have noted the ISI’s aggressive approach, prioritizing operational goals over careful risk assessment. This focus, described by columnist Thomas Ricks, has led to miscalculations, such as the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Although initially met with skepticism, India’s claim that the ISI had prior knowledge of the attacks has gained support among Western analysts.

Researchers like Siegfried Wolf argue that Pakistan’s denials of involvement in terrorism are undermined by statements from its own officials. Similarly, Sean Gregory observes that the ISI’s cooperative tone with Western intelligence agencies reflects a passive counterterrorism stance, often described as a "do nothing" policy.

The Motive and Mastermind of the Mumbai Attacks
A significant breakthrough in understanding the 26/11 attacks came with the arrest of Pakistani-American David Headley (Dawood Gilani) in Denmark in 2009. Initially working as an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Headley came into contact with the ISI during a visit to Pakistan. He was subsequently handed over to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and tasked with conducting reconnaissance missions for the group.

Between 2006 and 2008, Headley made several visits to Mumbai, capturing videos and photographs that were instrumental in LeT’s meticulous planning of the attack. According to Headley’s testimony in a U.S. court, he received training in intelligence gathering from ISI officers, including financial support. Of the $29,500 he received for his operations, $28,500 came from an ISI officer identified as “Major Iqbal,” making him the first ISI operative prosecuted by the U.S. government for terrorism-related charges.

Headley also named Sajid Majid (often referred to as Sajid Mir), the deputy head of LeT’s external operations, as the coordinator of the Mumbai attack. Majid was known for directing global jihadists and had a reputation for meticulous planning. According to Headley, the attackers received specialized training from former Pakistani army commandos, further corroborating claims of state-sponsored involvement.

The Role of the ISI and Internal Rifts
Headley’s interrogation revealed key motives for the attacks. By 2007, LeT faced internal divisions as younger cadres sought to break away, frustrated by the group’s subservience to the ISI. To maintain control, ISI operatives allegedly supported the 26/11 attacks to bolster LeT’s standing within Pakistan’s jihadist community.

Breakthroughs and Diplomatic Fallout
The arrest of Ajmal Kasab by Mumbai police disrupted LeT’s plans. Kasab provided crucial details about the attackers’ training in Pakistan. Eleven months later, Headley’s arrest added further evidence, and in 2012, Saudi Arabia extradited Zabiuddin Ansari, another key figure who disclosed additional details. Ansari confirmed that the attackers were coached to use Hindi phrases and make statements to Indian media, aiming to disguise their identities.

Ansari also revealed that the ISI supplied weapons and ammunition and that ISI officers were present in LeT’s Karachi control room during the attacks. These claims were corroborated by Headley, adding weight to allegations of ISI complicity.

Implications for India-Pakistan Relations
The attacks occurred during a period of improving India-Pakistan relations, deepening India’s sense of betrayal. Pakistan’s initial denial of the attackers’ nationality further strained ties, and it took Islamabad 42 days to acknowledge Kasab’s Pakistani citizenship. This delayed admission damaged Pakistan’s credibility internationally.

The 26/11 attacks remain a stark reminder of the complexities of counterterrorism in South Asia, where state and non-state actors often blur the lines between national security policies and extremist agendas.
International Pressure and Limited Investigations Post-Mumbai Attacks
The aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks revealed Pakistan's mixed response to international pressure, particularly its partial cooperation in investigating the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In December 2008, under Western scrutiny, Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) conducted raids on LeT camps. However, key conspirators like Sajid Majeed reportedly escaped arrest due to ISI interference, according to later testimony by Zabiuddin Ansari. Notable arrests included Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, whose intercepted communications showed him directing the Mumbai gunmen.

In a 2015 Dawn article, former FIA chief Tariq Khosa acknowledged that the Mumbai attacks were planned and launched from Pakistani soil. He detailed the LeT's use of Karachi as a control hub and Sindh for training camps. However, Khosa’s account omitted any mention of ISI involvement, reflecting the sensitive and politically charged nature of the investigation. Despite Khosa's efforts to stress the need for accountability, subsequent judicial and prosecutorial delays undermined progress. Judges were frequently changed, and one prosecutor was murdered in 2013, showcasing a lack of institutional commitment to delivering justice.

Diplomatic and Legal Maneuvering
In January 2009, India submitted a 69-page dossier to Pakistan and other countries affected by the attack, containing transcripts of Sajid Majeed directing gunmen to kill Western hostages. This, coupled with mounting international pressure, led to some arrests by the FIA. However, Islamabad's cooperation waned over time, with stalled court proceedings and no real accountability for ISI-linked operatives.

The ISI itself officially distanced from the attacks. Former ISI chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha reportedly blamed the attacks on “rogue elements” within LeT, but no credible action was taken to prosecute them. This narrative reflected an attempt to maintain plausible deniability while deflecting international criticism.

The Role of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa
Western intelligence agencies and the UN Security Council have long identified LeT and its front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), as terrorist entities. While Pakistan outwardly complied with international demands by symbolically banning these groups, domestic enforcement was superficial at best. For example, a 2009 report revealed that JuD was never truly placed on Pakistan’s proscribed list, despite UN designations. The ban announced in 2008 lacked legal weight and was only reinforced under pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) a decade later.

Even after renewed bans in 2018 and 2019, implementation remained weak. Seizures of JuD properties were symbolic, involving inspections rather than operational shutdowns. Public support for LeT, particularly in regions sympathetic to their activities in Kashmir, complicated enforcement. A significant portion of the Pakistani population viewed these groups as benevolent, emphasizing their charitable work while ignoring their role in terrorism.

Societal Challenges and Structural Gaps
The broader challenge in addressing groups like LeT lies in public perception and structural inadequacies. Studies have shown that many Pakistanis remain unaware of LeT’s violent operations, particularly those targeting civilians in India. There is widespread skepticism about allegations against Pakistan-based jihadist groups, with many viewing their actions as either justified or inconsequential.

Counterterrorism analysts like Joshua White and Madiha Afzal have highlighted this informational gap. While foreign observers recognize LeT’s role in international terrorism, domestic audiences often see them as aligned with Pakistan’s strategic goals in Kashmir. This disconnect reinforces Islamabad’s reluctance to take definitive action, as public sentiment and state priorities remain aligned against external pressure.

Possible link between Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaeda
According to British investigative journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, the bin Laden hideout in Abbottabad may have been built on land purchased by Lashkar-e-Taiba. Scott-Clark and Levy make another claim in their critically acclaimed book The Exile, which chronicles bin Laden's years on the run.

In 2008, according to two former aides of Lashkar-e-Taiba leader Hafiz Saeed, Osama traveled to Mansehra to attend an extraordinary meeting for the November 26, 2008 Mumbai operation (known as 26/11). It was aided by LeT, which was supervised by the ISI's S-Wing, and sponsored by al-Qaeda.

Additionally, documents seized in the US commando raid that killed bin Laden revealed that Hafez Saeed was in correspondence with the al-Qaeda chief until his death and the trial of David Headley. These findings led the US to announce a reward for information leading to Saeed's arrest and conviction.

Indian Perspectives After the Mumbai Attacks
The need to diplomatically prove Pakistan's involvement in the Mumbai attacks dominated Indian policy responses (including the exclusion of military retaliation). At the time of 26/11, Shiv Shankar Menon, India's Foreign Secretary, who later served as National Security Advisor, gave the following arguments for India not going to war.

Consider what would have happened if India had attacked Pakistan. First, the fact of the terrorist attacks in India was concealed from Pakistan. This would have involved official participation on the part of Pakistan. Instead, as far as the world was concerned, the incident would have become just another India-Pakistan dispute. Faced with a dispute between two traditional rivals, the default world response has been to appeal for peace and, in the name of fairness or impartiality, to apportion blame and credit 50:50. This is also what the Pakistani military wants.

Menon argues that rather than escalating the attacks in 2008, India chose a policy of pursuing legal means against the perpetrators of the attacks. Yet, Pakistan did not respond with cooperation. Instead, it took as few steps as possible against the LeT. Menon suggested in 2016 that, with the Mumbai trial stalled in Pakistan, New Delhi had no incentive to back down in the event of another large-scale attack. His assessment was proven correct in the weeks that followed, when the Indian army raided LeT camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in retaliation for jihadist attacks on Indian military bases.

Conclusion: Terrorism is not always a stateless phenomenon

This article begins with three hypotheses about the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. The first hypothesis, widely believed by Indian analysts both inside and outside the government, is that the attacks were a continuation of a long-running covert war waged by the ISI through ‘non-state’ proxies.

This argument is based on a significant event in Mumbai’s history. More than 15 years before the 26/11 attacks, a series of bombings killed 257 people in the city on March 12, 1993. Police investigators discovered that the bombs were planted by members of a local drug trafficking gang, whose leaders were Indian criminals living in Dubai.

When New Delhi tried to extradite the gang leaders, Dubai authorities pressured them to leave the UAE. What happened next remains controversial: Indian government spokesmen insisted that the fugitives had taken refuge in Karachi.

Pakistani spokesmen rejected the claim. More than a year later, one of the fugitives was arrested while walking from Nepal. After being handed over to Indian police, he said in a television interview that the remaining masterminds of the 1993 bombings were living in Karachi under the protection of the ISI. His claims, while likely to be dismissed as pressured, were corroborated by photographic, video and audio-recorded ‘evidence’.

After the bombings, New Delhi launched a diplomatic offensive to persuade the US to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. As part of this effort, India’s external intelligence service provided the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with an unexploded detonator recovered from the failed Mumbai bombings. The detonator was American-made and its serial number was linked to Pakistani military stocks. which the US had produced during the Soviet-Afghan War.

However, the CIA argued that the mere fact of the detonator’s origin was not proof of Pakistani state sponsorship of the bombing. It could have been a low-level theft. It has been claimed that the offending detonator was ‘accidentally’ destroyed during testing in a laboratory. Decades later, the corridors of the Indian security establishment still hold bitter memories of the incident.

The 1993 bombings and their dismal results gave rise to two principles in India’s assessment of international terrorism: that Pakistan, as a state, would at least provide sanctuary to terrorists who attack India, and that, even if Pakistan presented forensic evidence in a specific case, the involvement of state agencies, the US preferred to look the other way unless it targeted its own interests. Thus, by the time of the 26/11 attacks, India’s suspicions of Pakistan in the context of Mumbai had been present for fifteen years.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that India and the US had come very close to cooperating against jihadist groups, particularly Lashkar-e-Taiba. Sajid Majeed is now on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list for his role in 26/11. The agency, using his alias 'Sajid Mir', said he was 'believed to be in Pakistan.' He has been declared a resident of Pakistan, a claim Islamabad has consistently denied.

The second hypothesis, preferred by most Western analysts, is that the Lashkar-e-Taiba leadership and individual ISI officers were involved in the 2008 attacks. This line of reasoning stops short of blaming the Pakistani state as a unitary actor. Instead, it sees the possibility of ‘rogue operatives’ using state resources to pursue a private jihadi agenda. Such a view might explain why serving ISI officers such as Major Iqbal and Major Sameer Ali may have supported the attacks or been personnel of the Pakistani army’s special forces (either serving, retired or technically ‘discharged’ from active service) but why would he have trained the gunmen who attacked Mumbai? It would also explain the overlapping details between the accounts of the interrogations of Kasab, Headley and Ansari, even though the three men played different roles in the attacks and were interrogated under different circumstances.

The third hypothesis about the 26/11 attacks, that it was the work of a single non-state actor, is not supported by the historical record. Pakistan’s failure to prosecute alleged perpetrators either indicates a lack of investigative capacity or bad faith. The balance of the investigation is off by the fact that Islamabad took just two months to prosecute a Pakistani national who helped the CIA kill Osama bin Laden (who received a long prison sentence).

The Pakistani government is keen to adopt a highly selective approach to terrorism. Pakistan has recently done so in the specific case of the ISI’s involvement in the 26/11 attacks.

It is not yet clear why Saudi Arabia opposed the extradition of Zabiuddin Ansari to India. However, his statement to the Indian police was completely baseless. These statements clearly implicate ISI officers serving in the Lashkar-e-Taiba control room in Karachi, a claim that seems to be confirmed by Steve Cole’s reporting on Western intelligence interventions during the attacks. Ansari appears to be revealing more than Pakistan wants.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks showed that even after 9/11, terrorists did not necessarily become ‘enemies of all mankind’. At the very least, Pakistan has shown itself to be inconsistent in taking action against terrorists based on its territory. This is a binding obligation under UNSC 1267.

The involvement of the Pakistani state is still under debate, but the role of individual officers within LeT and the ISI is now considered beyond serious dispute in most quarters. One policy question remains: what should the international community’s response be to another Mumbai attack? This question takes on greater relevance in nuclear South Asia, given that the US struggled in the 1980s to find an appropriate set of tools to counter state-sponsored terrorism by non-nuclear powers. As far as India is concerned, it has shown restraint on more than one occasion. But to no avail.